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DEMONIZING YOUTH
Linda S. Beres* and Thomas D. Griffith**
Why can't they be like we were?
Perfect in every way!
What's the matter with Aids today?'
I. INTRODUCTION
Youth in general, and young minority males in particular, often
are demonized by legislators, the media, scholars, and the public at
large. These attacks reinforce stereotypes and place a particularly
heavy burden on young Black and Latino males.2 Negative images
of youth also may inhibit the adoption of the most effective programs
to reduce crime, especially in disadvantaged inner-city neighbor-
hoods?
Viewing young minority males as the enemy fosters illegal po-
lice conduct like that exhibited by the Rampart CRASH unit. In-
deed, the name itself, Community Response to Street Hoodlums,
evokes images of incorrigible offenders for whom rehabilitation pro-
grams are fruitless.4  Conceptualizing the crime-control mission in
military terms----'War on Drugs" and "War on Gangs"-can
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School.
** John B. Milliken Professor of Taxation, University of Southern Califor-
nia Law School. We would like to thank Jeannine Taylor for her excellent re-
search assistance.
1. Charles Strouse & Lee Adams, Kids, on BYE BYE BIRDIE (Columbia
Records 1960).
2. Other minority groups and females may also be affected. See Davan
Maharaj, Rights Suits Involving Police Photos Settled, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12,
1995, at Al (reporting settlement of lawsuit brought by Asian female teenagers
who were detained and photographed as suspected gang members by Garden
Grove police).
3. See Tom Hayden, Commentary, We Need Peacemakers Like Alex San-
chez Gangs: Respected Leader of Homies Unidos Could Help Steer Youths in
the Right Direction, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000, at Bll.
4. See id.
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encourage an "ends justifies the means" attitude.5 The resulting po-
lice conduct can vary from the oft-reported false testifying of officers
regarding the circumstances surrounding a stop or search,6 to the
more extreme case of shooting and then framing an innocent man.
7
This same attitude can lead prosecutors and judges to accept ques-
tionable police testimony.8 In addition, it can lead voters to pass dra-
conian anti-crime measures directed against young offenders, such as
Proposition 21 ("Prop. 21").
5. See, e.g., George J. Bryjak, Opinion, The Militarization of Police
Forces, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Sept. 3, 2000, at G3 (stating that some Ram-
part CRASH officers viewed themselves more as soldiers out to destroy the
enemy than peace officers); Sharon Dolovich, Commentary, Invasion of Swat
Team Leaves Trauma and Death, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2000, at B9 (noting
troubling trend of using paramilitary units to execute drug warrants in the war
on drugs); Tom Hayden, LAPD: Law and Disorder, NATION, Apr. 10, 2000, at
6 (decrying paramilitary tactics police have used against inner-city youths un-
der the rubric of a war on gangs and drugs); Hayden, supra note 3, at B 11
(stating that the "any means are justified" nature of the LAPD's war on gangs
is at the heart of the Rampart scandal); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, An Inde-
pendent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department's Board of Inquiry Re-
port on the Rampart Scandal 34 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 545, 564 (2001) (noting
mentality in LAPD that all efforts, including perjury and planting evidence,
were justified to remove gangs from the street).
6. See Ted Rohrlich, Scandal Shows Why Innocent Plead Guilty, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1999, at Al (describing belief of some police administrators
and legal commentators that police frequently lie to justify an unlawful search
for drugs or weapons).
7. See id. (describing case of Javier Ovando, who was shot and framed by
police for allegedly assaulting them with a machine gun that they had planted
on him). Though innocent, Ovando served three years of a twenty-three year
sentence before being released in the wake of the Rampart scandal. See id.;
see also Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 549 (noting the Ovando case as an ex-
ample of the innocent people who were convicted as a result of Rampart offi-
cers fabricating evidence against them).
8. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xxi-xxii (1982) (describ-
ing the unwritten "rules" of the criminal justice game that allow and encourage
police to lie about constitutional violations); Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 628
(noting the prevailing perception emerging from the Rampart scandal that
many judges, and especially those who formerly were prosecutors, automati-
cally believe that police officers are testifying truthfully); see also id. at 624-31
(advocating placing statutory or ethical duty on judges to report police perjury
as necessary to combat false testimony and other misconduct).
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II. PROPOSrION 21
Although titled the "Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Preven-
tion Act of 1998," Prop. 21 was approved by the voters in an initia-
tive referendum on March 7, 2000.9 Prop. 21 provided several "get
tough" measures for participants in gang-related activities.' 0 It also
transferred from judges to prosecutors the power to decide whether
offenders as young as fourteen would be tried as adults or as juve-
niles for certain serious crimes." An analysis of Prop. 21 is beyond
the scope of this Article.12 It is revealing, however, to examine its
"Finding and Declarations."' 3 These include:
o "While overall crime is declining, juvenile crime has be-
come a larger and more ominous threat."'
4
D "[F]rom 1983 to 1992 ... murders committed by juve-
niles more than doubled."' 5
* "Criminal street gangs have become more violent, bolder,
and better organized in recent years.' 6
o "Vigorous enforcement and the adoption of more mean-
ingful criminal sanctions, including [Three Strikes] has
resulted in a substantial and consistent four year decline
9. See Proposition 21, § 1, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL
ELECTION 119 (Mar. 7, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 CALIFORNIA BALLOT
PAMPHLET].
10. See, e.g., id. §§ 3-4, 6, 11, at 119, 121-22 (codified at CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 182.5, 186.22, 186.26, 190.2 (West Supp. 2001)).
11. See id. § 26, at 126-29 (codified at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707
(West Supp. 2001)); see also Demian Bulwa, Boy, 15, May be 1st Tried as
Adult in State; Case Fuels Debate Over Drastic Changes to Juvenile System
From Proposition 21, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct 5, 2000, at A4 (noting that Propo-
sition 21 gave prosecutors the power to file directly in adult court certain cases
against juveniles ages fourteen to seventeen).
12. For a brief summary of some of the most troubling provisions of Propo-
sition 21, see Patricia M. Schnegg, A Vote of No Confidence in Proposition 21,
L.A. LAw., Mar. 2000, at 11 (describing the serious concerns of the Los An-
geles County Bar with various provisions of the proposed law).
13. See Proposition 21, § 2, in 2000 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra
note 9, at 119.
14. Id. § 2(a).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 2(b).
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in overall crime. Violent juvenile crime has proven
most resistant to this positive trend.'
' 7
" "Gang-related crimes pose a unique threat to the public
because of gang members' organization and solidar-ty,,18
ity. 11
" "Dramatic changes are needed in the way we treat juve-
nile criminals, criminal street gangs, and the confidenti-
ality of the juvenile records of violent offenders if we
are to avoid the predicted, unprecedented surge in juve-
nile and gang violence."'19
In short, the backers of Prop. 21 argue that tougher penalties for
youth crime are needed because violent crime by youths, and espe-
cially by youths in gangs, is increasing now and will likely increase
even more rapidly in the near future. Prop. 21's "finding" of a "pre-
dicted, unprecedented surge in juvenile and gang violence" is based
on two factual assumptions:
1. The number of juveniles in the "crime-prone ages be-
tween 12 and 17" is going to increase significantly in
the near future.2 °
2. These youths will be much more dangerous than those
of prior generations.2'
It is far from clear, however, that the ages 12 to 17 are the "crime-
prone ages" or that the coming youth cohort is more dangerous than
prior cohorts.
HI. YOUTH AND CRIME
Are serious violent crimes most likely to be committed by indi-
viduals between the ages of 12 and 17? Consider Figure 1, which
shows the number of homicide arrests22 by age in the United States
in 1997.23
17. Id. § 2(c).
18. Id. § 2(h).
19. Id. § 2(k).
20. Id. § 2(d).
21. See id.
22. Homicide arrests, as used in this Article, include arrests for murder and
nonnegligent manslaughter.
23. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
["34:747
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Figure 1: Homicde Arrests by Age, 1997
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Homicide arrest rates are highest from age 17 to 21 with the
peaks occurring at ages 18 and 19. Homicides by youths under the
age of 16 are relatively rare. A similar pattern occurs for violent
crime generally, as shown in Figure 2.24 Arrest statistics, moreover,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 338-39 tbl.4.7 (1998) [herein-
after SOURCEBOOK]. The Sourcebook reports data by individual ages for 15-
24, but combines ages 10-12 and ages 13-14. Thus, the data point for age 12 in
Figure 1 and Figure 2, infra, indicates all homicides committed by offenders
ages 10-12. The data points for ages 13 and 14 each show one-half the total
homicides committed by offenders ages 13-14. This overstates the offense rate
for age 13 and understates the rate for age 14.
California statistics are reported in broad age groups rather than indi-
vidual ages. Nevertheless, it is clear that the offense rate does not peak in the
12-17 age group. In 1998, for example, offenders under the age of 18 ac-
counted for 308 homicide arrests, as compared to 375 arrests for offenders ages
18-19 and 869 arrests for offenders ages 20-29. See Div. OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE INFO. SERVS., CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN
CALIFORNIA 131 tbl.32 (1998) [hereinafter CRIME & DELINQUENCY]. Crime
& Delinquency is published annually and contains detailed statistical informa-
tion about crime in California. Except where otherwise indicated, data on
California crime in this Article is taken directly from Crime & Delinquency for
the relevant years or is calculated by the authors using data contained in Crime
& Delinquency.
24. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, at 338-39. Violent crimes are: mur-
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overstate the extent of youth crime because teenagers tend to commit
crimes in groups.
25
Figure 2: Violent Crime Arrests by Age, 1997
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Arrests for violent crimes peak slightly earlier than arrests for
homicide, largely due to arrests of youths for aggravated assault.
Violent crime arrests are highest from age 17 to 19 with the peak oc-
curring at age 18.
Contrary to the claims of Prop. 21, the most crime prone ages
are 17 to 21, not ages 12 to 17. Nevertheless, it is true that 17-year-
old youths and, to a lesser extent, 16-year-old youths do commit
crimes at a fairly high rate, similar to that of individuals in their early
20s. But the backers of Prop. 21 mislead the public when they lump
the crime rates for 16 and 17-year-olds together with the much lower
crime rates for 12 to 14-year-olds.
der and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated as-
sault. Violent crime statistics are dominated by aggravated assault because
there are far more arrests for this offense than for all other violent crimes com-
bined. See id.
25. See Howard N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE ARRESTS 2
(1998) (noting that it is relatively common for many juvenile arrests to result
from one crime since youths are more likely to commit crimes in groups).
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IV. THE PREDICTED TIDE OF SUPER-PREDATORS
Perhaps more frightening than the projected growth in the num-
ber of young teenagers is the prediction that these teenagers will be
much more likely to commit serious violent crime than teenagers in
the past. The most prominent advocate of this claim is John J. Diu-
lio, Jr.26 As youth crime rose in the late 1980s and early 1990s, DiI-
ulio's warning of the emergence of a new, more dangerous type of
youthful offender was widely reported in the popular press. 27 Dfiulio
continued to sound the alarm even as violent youth crime was begin-
ning to decline in the mid-1990s.
DiIulio coined the lurid phrase "super-predators" to describe this
new breed of juvenile offenders.28 The image evoked was one of in-
dividuals devoid of humanity: "[A] few years ago, I forswore re-
search inside juvenile lock-ups. The buzz of impulsive violence, the
vacant stares and smiles, and the remorseless eyes were at once too
frightening and too depressing (my God, these are children!) for me
to pretend to 'study' them.,
29
These super-predators lack the normal human desires for affec-
tion, companionship, and respect. And unlike other humans, they are
impervious to punishment:
On the horizon, therefore, are tens of thousands of severely
morally impoverished juvenile super-predators .... They
fear neither the stigma of arrest nor the pain of imprison-
ment.... In prison or out, the things that super-predators
get by their criminal behavior-sex, drugs, money-are
their own immediate rewards. Nothing else matters to
them.3
0
26. See John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY.
STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 23.
27. See, e.g., Peter Annin, 'Superpredators' Arrive, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22,
1996, at 57; David Gergen, Editorial, Taming Teenage Wolf Packs, U.S. NEws
& WORLD REP., Mar. 25, 1996, at 68; Richard Zoglin, Now For the Bad News:
A Teenage Time Bomb, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996, at 52.
28. See Dilulio, supra note 26, at 23.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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The warnings of Difulio and others31 formed the intellectual un-
derpinning of the hyper-punitive approach to crime control that led to
legislation like Prop. 21 and "Three Strikes" in California.32 At the
national level, DiIulio's terminology was embraced by U.S. Repre-
sentative Bill McCollum when he introduced a crime bill, the "Vio-
lent Youth Predator Act of 1996, ' '3 which would have required adult
prosecution of children as young as thirteen for certain offenses.
V. YOUTH CRIME TRENDS
A coming flood of remorseless young plunderers, killers, and
rapists who cannot be deterred or rehabilitated certainly is frighten-
ing. But how real is the threat?
Figure 3 shows that homicide arrests in California for offenders
under 20 years of age more than doubled between 1986 and 1991 .
34
Youth homicide arrests then were cut almost in half between 1991
and 1998." 5
31. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON CRIME IN AM., THE STATE OF VIOLENT CRIME IN
AMERICA (1996) (warning of dramatically increased rates of violent juvenile
crime that could spiral out of control by the year 2000).
32. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(2)(A) (West Supp. 1999).
33. H.R. 3565, 104th Cong. § 1 (1996). This title proved controversial.
Democrats characterized the term "predator" as dehumanizing hype and de-
manded the title of the bill be changed. McCollum subsequently titled the bill
the "Juvenile Crime Control Act." See John J. Dilulio, Jr., How to Deal With
the Youth Crime Wave, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 16, 1996, at 30 (castigating
Democrats for forcing the name change); Richard Lacayo, Teen Crime: Con-
gress Wants to Crack Down on Juvenile Offenders. But is Throwing Teens into
Adult Courts--and Adult Prisons-the Best Way?, TIME, July 21, 1997, at 26
(describing the politics of juvenile crime legislation); see also H.R. REP. No.
105-86 (1997) (juvenile crime bill introduced by McCollum in 1997, entitled
"Juvenile Crime Control Act of 1997"). McCollum was not the only politician
who embraced Dilulio's imagery. See Patrick J. McDonnell, Highly Touted
Theory on Age, Crime Disputed, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 1997, at B1 (reporting
Bob Dole's use of this image during his 1996 presidential campaign); Franklin
Zimring, Crying Wolf Over Teen Demon, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1996, at B5
(noting same and the increasing political importance of Dilulio's language and
sense of alarm).
34. Six hundred eighteen homicide arrests occurred in 1986, and 1307 in
1991. See CRIME & DELINQUENCY, supra note 23.
35. Six hundred eighty-three homicide arrests took place in 1998. See id.
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Figure 3: California Homicide Arrests of Offenders Undar Age 20
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The homicide rate rose and then fell for all youth, but the roller
coaster pattern was more pronounced for minorities. Figure 4 shows
the relative changes in the youth homicide arrest rate by ethnic
group, setting the 1986 rate for each group equal to 100.36 For young
Whites, the homicide rate rose by 29% from 1986 to 1991 and then
dropped by 48% from 1991 to 1998. For young Blacks, the homi-
cide rate peaked in 1990 at a rate 75% above the 1986 level and then
dropped by 70% from 1990 to 1998. The rate changes were even
more dramatic for young Hispanics. The Hispanic youth homicide
rate increased by 196% from 1986 to 1991 and then dropped by 53%
from 1991 to 1998. Note that the drop in the homicide rate for each
group began several years before the passage of the California Three
Strikes law in 1994.17 The drop in the California youth homicide
36. See id.
37. For detailed critiques of the claim that Three Strikes deserves credit for
the drop in crime in California, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMiRING ET AL., CRIME &
PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA: THE IMPACT OF THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE
January 2001]
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rate is not unique. Across the nation, offense rates for homicide and
for serious crime generally have dropped for youth offenders.38 In
light of these trends, it is hard to justify predictions that the nation
stands on the brink of a youth crime explosion.
Figure 4: California Homicide Arresl Rales of
Offenders Under Age 20 by Race (1986=100)
I... 0.- Whie- --- Hispanic - B--l-ackI
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Year 3 Stdlkes
Enacted
1998
VI. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND THE GANG THREAT
Table I shows that a majority of the population continued to be-
lieve that the crime problem was getting worse years after crime
OuT 65-84 (1999), and Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Did "Three
Strikes" Cause the Recent Drop in California Crime? An Analysis of the Cali-
fornia Attorney General's Report, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 101 (1998).
38. See SNYDER, supra note 25, at 1 (stating that juvenile arrests for violent
crime declined each year from 1995-98 and that juvenile arrests for murder de-
clined each year from 1994-98); Press Release, United States Department of
Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 1999 (Oct.
15, 2000) (on file with author) (stating that arrests of youths for violent crimes
decreased by eight percent in 1999).
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rates began to drop.39 In 1992, when crime rates were still rising in
many areas, eighty-nine percent of the surveyed population believed
that crime was getting worse. By 1998, when crime had been drop-
ping for several years in most of the country, the percentage of those
polled who believed crime was rising had dropped to fifty-two per-
cent. Still, citizens who believed crime was rising outnumbered
those who thought crime was dropping by almost a three to two ratio.
And fear of youth crime, fueled by heavily publicized school shoot-
ings in Columbine and elsewhere, was rising.
40
TABLE 1: SURVEY OF THE GENERAL POPULATION
Is There More Crime in the U.S. Than There
Was a Year Ago, or Less?
More Less
1992 89 3
1996 71 15
1997 64 25
1998 52 35
Fear of youth crime often is focused on gangs. Prop. 21, for ex-
ample, was justified by a "finding" that youth gangs were a growing
39. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, at 116 tbl.2.33.
40. See, e.g., KIM BROOKS ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY INST., SCHOOL HOUSE
HYPE: Two YEARS LATER (2000) (describing public perception that school
violence is increasing despite government statistics showing that it is declin-
ing); Vincent Schiraldi, Commentary, Juvenile Crime is Decreasing-It's Me-
dia Coverage That's Soaring, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1999, at B7 (noting that
excessive media coverage of extremely rare school shootings may explain the
public belief that juvenile crime is increasing); David Shaw, Kids Are People
Too, Papers Decide: By Focusing on the Unusual and the Negative, Critics
Say, Journalists Prompt a Distorted View of Reality, L.A. TIMES, July 11,
2000, at Al (reporting author Mike Males's remarks that the media coverage
of Columbine was "one of the most irresponsible events in the history of insti-
tutional America" and has fueled a "baseless panic" of youths that has led to
harsh juvenile laws); see also David Westphal, Juvenile Crime is Falling
Rapidly, But Public Believes Youth Crime Is Still on the Increase, NEWS TRIB.
(Tacoma, Wash.), Dec. 12, 1999, at Al (noting remarks by some commenta-
tors that juvenile crime has dropped dramatically but that the public believes it
is still rising).
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threat to the safety of the community.41 In fact, however, crime rates
have dropped most rapidly among Black and Latino youth, the
demographic groups reputed to be most dominated by youth gangs.
42
This suggests that criminal gang activity was substantially reduced.
The perceptions of law enforcement officials who deal with
crime on a daily basis might be expected to be more accurate than
those of the general public. Table 2 shows, however, that despite
strong evidence that gang crime had been dropping for years, law en-
forcement agencies were much more likely to believe that the gang
problem was getting worse than to believe it was improving.
4 3
TABLE 2: 1997 NATIONAL GANG YOUTH SURVEY OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
Is the Gang Problem in Your Jurisdiction
Getting Better or Worse?
Getting Staying the Getting
Worse Same Better
1995 49% 41% 10%
1997 35% 45% 20%
The belief that youth gangs "pose a unique threat 44 and have
"become more violent, bolder, and better organized ' 45 produces a
popular demand for "get tough" policies against gang members. The
following is only a partial list of such policies.
The formation of specialized antigang law enforcement
units, like the LAPD's CRASH unit, which lies in the
41. See Proposition 21, § 2, in 2000 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra
note 9, at 119.
42. By 1998, homicides by Hispanics in California had dropped fifty-three
percent from their 1991 peak. See CRIME & DELINQUENCY, supra note 23.
Homicides by Blacks had dropped seventy percent from their 1990 peak. See
id.
43. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 NATIONAL YOUTH GANG SURVEY 36 figs.17 & 18
(1999) [hereinafter YOUTH GANG SURVEY]. The 1997 survey is the most re-
cent one available.
44. Proposition 21, § 2(h), in 2000 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra
note 9, at 119.
45. Id. § 2(b).
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center of the police misconduct scandal in the Rampartdivision.46
Statutes providing for enhanced criminal penalties for
crimes committed by gang members.47
Civil injunctions that would enjoin alleged gang mem-
bers from engaging in ordinarily legal activities such as
walking or driving in a car with other alleged gang
members.48
o Creation of centralized databases of alleged gang mem-
bers and "associates" for the use of law enforcement of-
ficials.49
* Police officers stop, question and, if possible, search
suspected gang members even if there is no evidence
that they are currently committing a crime.50
A detailed analysis of these anti-gang policies is beyond the
scope of this Article. We will examine briefly, however, the impact
of gang databases on young minority males.
VII. GANG DATABASES
During the 1990s law enforcement agencies across the nation
increasingly made use of computer-based gang databases.5' These
46. See YOUTH GANG SURVEY, supra note 43, at 33 (noting results of 1995
survey indicating large number of responding police and sheriff's departmants
had specialized units to address the gang problem); David Dotson, Opinion,
The State Crossing the (Blue) Line: How Not to Run the LAPD, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1999, at MI (noting the mission of the LAPD's highly specialized
anti-gang CRASH units to wage war on gangs and drugs).
47. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b) (West 1999).
48. See Matt Lait, Ganging Up on Gangs: L.A. is the U.S. Leader in In-
junctions Barring Gang Members From All Manner of Activiy,, L.A. TIMEs,
May 28, 1999, at B2 (describing popularity of such injunctions in Los Angeles
and other Southern California communities).
49. See Anne-Marie O'Connor, Massive Gang Member List Now Clouded
by Rampart, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2000, at A3 (describing CAL/GANG data-
base and other gang tracking systems and databases).
50. See, e.g., Maharaj, supra note 2, at Al (describing Garden Grove police
practice of detaining and photographing suspected gang members for inclusion
in gang file).
51. See, e.g., Jim Adams, Officers Share Names to Battle Gangs, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis-St Paul), Feb. 24, 1998, at B1 (describing Minnesota gang
January 2001]
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databases contain the lists of alleged gang members and gang associ-
ates, together with personal information about each entry. Informa-
tion entered into a database might include the person's gang mem-
bership, gang moniker, home address, identifying marks or tattoos,
and even photographs. Remarkably, the information often is gath-
ered from the alleged gang members themselves. Police officers will
stop suspected gang members, question them about their gang mem-
bership and even take their photographs. Youths stopped and ques-
tioned by the police may fear retaliation if they refuse to answer the
questions asked or if they deny permission to be photographed.
There are few safeguards against being falsely identified as a
gang member. Lists are secret; access is denied to the public.52 In-
dividuals have no right to know that they have been placed on a
list.5 3 Police officers are not required to get approval from a judge or
magistrate before entering a name on a database.5 4 An individual
may be entered on a gang database even if he has never been arrested
or suspected of a crime. Once entered into a database, it seldom is
possible for individuals to get their names removed.
56
database); Ellen Lord, Cops Getting Primer on City's Gangs; Database
Teaches Colors, Signage, CINCINNATI POST, Dec. 22, 1999, at Al 9 (describing
installation of gang database in Ohio city); Renae Merle, Coryn, Perry Tout
New Laws Aimed at Gangs, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEWs, June 30, 1999, at
B7 (noting creation of statewide anti-gang database in Texas); O'Connor, su-
pra note 49, at A3 (describing California gang tracking systems including
CAL/GANG).
52. See Shawn Hubler, A Sobering Lesson in Guilt by Association, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2000, at B1 (noting that the contents of the tax-financed
CAL/GANG database are secret); O'Connor, supra note 49, at A3 (reporting
remarks of a police practices expert for the ACLU characterizing the
CAL/GANG database as a "secret blacklist").
53. See Hubler, supra note 52, at B1; O'Connor, supra note 49, at A3.
54. See O'Connor, supra note 49, at A3 (reporting that officers can enter
names if suspect matches two from list of gang criteria).
55. See Hubler, supra note 52, at B1 (reporting statements of California
Attorney General Bill Lockyer that the criteria for inclusion in the
CAL/GANG database were highly problematic and it included persons who
had committed no crimes); O'Connor, supra note 49, at A3 (reporting state-
ments of LAPD's gang coordinator that CAL/GANG database included per-
sons who had no arrest record).
56. See George Ramos, Youths Offered Way to Get Off Database, L.A.
TIMES, July 25, 2000, at B1. Recently the Los Angeles Sheriffs Department
initiated a program where under certain circumstances reputed gang members
can get off the state gang database. See id. (describing newly developed lin-
[34:747
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The criteria for placement on a gang list are broad. One set of
guidelines, for example, provides that names should be added to the
list only if two or more of the following gang criteria are met:
* Professes to being a gang member.
* Is deemed a gang member by a reliable source, such as
a trusted informant, teacher, or parent.
* Is called a gang member by an untested informant with
corroboration.
* Has gang graffiti on his personal property or clothing.
* Is observed, by an officer, using gang hand signs.
* Hangs around with gang members.
• Is arrested with gang members.
* Identifies his gang affiliation when brought to county
jail
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Some of the criteria have little probative weight. An individual
living in an area with a significant gang presence may find it difficult
to avoid "hanging around" with gang members. The problem is par-
ticularly tricky because an individual may not know which of his
neighbors the police regard as gang members. Other criteria are dif-
ficult to evaluate. It is hard to assess, for example, the reliability of
the information provided by a teacher, parent, or "trusted informant."
It is unclear what "corroboration" is needed to verify the statements
of an "untested informant." More important, even if the criteria were
sound, there is no independent check on whether a police officer has
applied the criteria correctly when adding an individual to the data-
base.
The vague criteria, secrecy of the process, and lack of judicial
review create a danger that police officers add many young, minority
males to the database simply because they wear hip-hop clothing and
live in poverty-stricken, high-crime areas. And there is substantial
evidence that this is precisely what has occurred in California.
One 1992 study of the Los Angeles gang database found almost
half of the Black men in the county between the ages of twenty-one
and twenty-four were on some gang list.58  A more recent
ited program).
57. See O'Connor, supra note 49, at A3.
58. See Sheryl Stolberg, 150,000 Are in Gangs, Report bv D.A. Claims,
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examination of the 112,000 purported Los Angeles gang members or
associates on the state CAL/GANG database found that 62,000 were
entered by specialized LAPD antigang CRASH units, including the
unit from the scandal-ridden Rampart division.59 About two-thirds
of the persons entered were Latinos and about one-third were
Blacks.6° Only about 2000 Whites were entered on the gang list.6'
The LAPD argues that the database is useful in the investigation
of crimes committed by gang members.62 Such tools against gang
violence are essential, it is argued, because of the large number of
gang-related crimes, defined broadly as any crime with a gang mem-
ber as a perpetrator or a victim, even if the crime was not connected
to a gang purpose. During one recent year, the LAPD noted, gang
members committed 7600 offenses, including 136 homicides.
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These crime figures, while not trivial, are small in comparison
with the alleged population of 112,000 gang members and associates
in Los Angeles County. If the LAPD's figures are correct and there
are 7600 gang crimes and 112,000 gang members, only one crime is
committed each year for every fifteen gang members or, put differ-
ently, the average gang member commits one crime every fifteen
years. Unless gang members are a surprisingly law abiding group,
the gang database includes many individuals who have ended their
gang involvement or who never were gang members in the first
place.
There is little doubt that gangs are an important social problem
and that hard-core gang members pose a significant threat to the
safety of the community. But gang databases contain many innocent
L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1992, at Al. Similar practices exist elsewhere. In Den-
ver, for example, two-thirds of the young Black men in the city apparently are
on the gang database. A reported 3691 Blacks were on the gang list, a number
equivalent to two-thirds of the Black males between twelve and twenty-four in
the city. See Dirk Johnson, 2 of3 Young Black Men in Denver Listed by Police
as Suspected Gangsters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1993, § 1, at 8 (noting also that
Blacks accounted for only five percent of the city's population but more than
fifty percent of the names on the gang list).
59. See O'Connor, supra note 49, at A3.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
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young minority males, who pose no serious threat to society, together
with individuals who are truly dangerous.
VIII. SOME COSTS OF DEMONIZATION
A. Reinforcing Racial Discrimination
The burden of the demonization of youth and youth gangs falls
most heavily on minorities, especially young minority males. The
names entered on gang databases are almost exclusively those of mi-
norities. Gang membership is so closely associated with minority
youth that in some jurisdictions most of the young minority males
are considered by the police to be gang members or associates.
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The close association of gang membership and minority status per-
mits politicians and commentators to "play the race card" indirectly.
Public officials may be reluctant to endorse a "war against young
minority offenders" or "tougher criminal penalties for young minori-
ties" because of a fear that they will be accused of racism It is much
safer to endorse a "war against gangs" or "tougher criminal penalties
for gang members." Gangs become a proxy for race.
Targeting minorities for special scrutiny can undermine the re-
lationship between police and the citizens they serve. As shown in
Table 3, Blacks and Hispanics are more than twice as likely as
Whites to believe that the police in their community do not treat all
races fairly.
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TABLE 3
Do the Police in Your Community Treat All Races Fairly
or Do They Tend To Treat One or More
of These Groups Unfairly? (1999)
Treat all races Treat one or more
fairly groups unfairly
White 67 25
Black 30 63
Hispanic 48 52
64. See Johnson, supra note 58, at 8.
65. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, at Ill tbl.2.28.
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Demonizing minority youth can create a climate that fosters po-
lice misconduct. If young offenders are "super-predators" and if the
operation against gangs is a "war," then violating a suspected gang
member's constitutional rights or even planting evidence may be
viewed as justified. Table 4 shows that Hispanics, and especially
Blacks, are far more likely to fear being arrested by the police for a
crime they did not commit.
66
TABLE 4
Are You Sometimes Afraid That the Police Will Stop
and Arrest You When You Are Completely
Innocent, or Not? (1999)
Yes, sometimes afraid No, not afraid
White 16 84
Black 43 56
Hispanic 28 72
It might be claimed that the burden placed on innocent Blacks
and Latinos is outweighed by the benefits of reducing crime. Con-
sider, for example, the use of gang lists to help police in crime in-
vestigations by creating a database of nicknames, addresses, photo-
graphs, identifying marks, and similar items. Even if many of the
people named in the database are innocent of any wrongdoing, it
might be argued that the harm to them is small. If they commit no
crime, a police investigation will absolve them.
Arguments such as these surely underestimate both the burden
of being a target of heightened police scrutiny and the likelihood of
false conviction. 67  More important, such arguments usually are
made by individuals who will never bear such burdens themselves.
If databases of gang members are an effective crime fighting tool,
then a database of all citizens would be much more effective. The
government could take fingerprints, DNA samples, and photographs
of all individuals above the age of twelve and enter the information
into a national computer system together with each individual's
66. See id. at 111 tbl.2.29.
67. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 549 (noting that thus far approxi-
mately 100 convictions have been overturned in the Rampart scandal).
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name, address, occupation, and other personal information. With pe-
riodic updates, such a database might be a powerful tool in the fight
against crime. Most citizens, we suspect, would reject such an inva-
sion of their privacy as repugnant even if such a database would re-
duce crime.
B. Underutilization ofNonipunitive Approaches to Crime Reduction
Strong criminal sanctions and a high probability of apprehension
can help reduce crime. Viewing young offenders as incorrigible su-
per-predators and street hoodlums, however, encourages a focus on
law enforcement even when less punitive approaches are a more
cost-effective way to reduce crime.
A recent study by RAND, for example, found that giving disad-
vantaged high school students cash and other incentives to graduate
was several times more effective in reducing crime, per dollar spent,
than the tougher penalties of Three Strikes.6S Parental training and
therapy for families with very young, school-age children who have
begun to "act out" in school was also substantially more cost-
effective at reducing crime than Three Strikes.
More broadly, demonizing criminal offenders deflects attention
away from the responsibility of society to remedy the social and eco-
nomic conditions that produce a high crime rate in poor urban neigh-
borhoods. Advocates of "get tough" approaches to crime argue that
young persons, however disadvantaged, must be held responsible for
their wrongdoing. Fair enough. But the privileged adults who con-
trol our nation's social policies should be held equally accountable
for their failure to address effectively poverty, poor health care, un-
derfunded schools, racial discrimination, and other social conditions
that produce high crime rates.
IX. CONCLUSION
The demonization of youth and especially young minority males
fosters abusive police behavior, reinforces racial stereotypes and
prevents the adoption of cost-effective, nonpunitive methods of re-
ducing crime. It can also have a devastating impact on innocent,
68. See PETER GREENWOOD ET AL., DIVERTING CHILDREN FROM A LIFE OF
CRIME: MEASURING COSTS AND BENEFITS 25-27 (1998).
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young minority males targeted by police as gang members or associ-
ates. Consider for example, the following excerpt from a school es-
say written by Jesus Daniel Guerrero, a B-student with no history of
misconduct who, with an older brother mixed up in gangs, was al-
most certainly placed on the CAL/GANG database:
As a child, I would spend countless hours daydreaming of
becoming a mighty police officer .... But as I entered my
junior high school years... my dream of becoming a police
officer began to fade like sunlight at dusk .... I have been
scolded, searched, handcuffed, pushed, kicked and wrong-
fully accused of crimes I did not commit.69
69. This essay was reported by columnist Shawn Hubler in A Sobering Les-
son in Guilt by Association, supra note 52, at BI (italics omitted).
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